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DECISION WITHOUT POWER-THE DILEMMA
OF THE SUPREME COURT
JEROME BARRON*
What should the Supreme Court do about those issues
upon which there is no national consensus but which never-
theless clearly raise constitutional questions of immense
significance? Should the Court refuse to decide questions
on the ground that it is better to forego decision than to
risk wholesale disobedience of its mandates? Examples
of this dilemma are plentiful in constitutional litigation: If
the states refuse to reapportion their legislatures, and Con-
gress refuses to correct the inaction of the states, should
the Court then enter when so many others have foreborne?
If some of the states refuse to desegregate their schools,
and if Congress refuses to instruct these recalcitrant mem-
bers of our union by statute that they must do so, should
the Court speak where other co-ordinate branches of govern-
ment have kept silent? If the Constitution says that only
Congress shall suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and the
President orders the writ suspended although Congress has
not acted, should the Court then tell the President he has
usurped the function of the Congress?
The foregoing questions are not moot or hypothetical.
They are rather descriptive of some of the most bitterly
contested constitutional struggles in our history Two of
the questions refer to cases which involve topics that have
become the subject matter of endless controversy in our
daily newspapers. One of the questions involves a matter
deeply buried in our history, an issue raised in 1861, but
an issue which remains even today fundamentally unre-
solved.
What is the proper blend of courage and forbearance?
When should the Court act and when should it refuse to act?
If Stalin had been a reader of the U. S. Supreme Court
reports, as doubtless he was not, he might have asked:
* A.B. 1955, Tufts; LL.B. 1958, Yale LL.M. 1960 George Washington Asst.
Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
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"How many armored divisions has the court?" To use a
less alien example of those who take a wholly pragmatic
view of law even though it emanates from the Supreme
Court: it was Andrew Jackson who allegedly remarked,
"John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce
it."
How far should the Court go in instructing the nation?
Even if it teaches good doctrine, doctrine that has an
eminently persuasive basis in precedent and constitutional
text, how forthright should it be in pronouncing its decision
on matters upon which we as a people are divided and
uncertain? Posing these questions makes it clear that one
of the most compelling problems in constitutional litigation
is fundamentally not a problem of law at all, but a problem
of power During Mr Justice Frankfurter's long reign on
the Court he never tired of admonishing that nine men
could not save the liberties a nation was bent on surrender-
ing, and that the Supreme Court, unlike Plato's guardians,
did not constitute a court of philosopher - kings empowered
to act as a permanent legislative revision commission. In
Baker v Carr,1 the case that finally brought the problem
of legislative reapportionment before the bar of the federal
courts for resolution, Mr Justice Frankfurter made this
pronouncement in dissent: 2
"The Court's authority - possessed neither of the
purse nor the sword - ultimately rests on sustained
public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling
must be nourished by the Court's complete detach-
ment, in fact and in appearance, from political
entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself
into the clash of political forces in political settle-
ments."
And again:
c there is not under our constitution a judicial
remedy for every political mischief, for every un-
desirable exercise of legislative power
In any event there is nothing judicially more
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. Id. at 267.
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unseemly nor more self-defeating than for this Court
to make in terrorem pronouncements, to indulge in
merely empty rhetoric, sending a word of promise to
the ear, sure to be disappointing to the hope."
Justice Frankfurter was, in fact, confessing that which
all of us admit: the Court has no armored divisions. Even
John Marshall could not enforce a decision when the litigants
were not inclined to obey and the other branches of govern-
ment looked the other way What Mr Justice Frankfurter
was saying, and saying with considerable eloquence, is that
the Court must not render decisions which will not be obeyed.
If the Court speaks where previously it has remained mute,
the argument runs, obedience to its mandates will be under-
mined not only in "thickets," to borrow Justice Frank-
furter's term, which have formerly been classified as "po-
litical," but also in those areas where its judicial competence
is long established.
Mr Justices Black and Douglas, for two, have refused
to heed Mr Justice Frankfurter's counsel - counsel that
is now delivered with the same zeal by Mr Justice Har-
lan - that it is better not to speak at all than to speak and
be ignored. It is a paradox that in the reapportionment
field, where the Court was so bitterly divided as to whether
it should pass judgment on a subject whose very
nature made it likely that its words might be so much
whistling in the wind, the Court has had very remark-
able influence in causing local legislatures to reconstruct
election districts. Yet as to the School Segregation Cases,
4
where the court at last prohibited that which it had so
long tolerated, not even the most sanguine approach to their
aftermath can lead to any conclusion other than that the
Court's decision has failed to receive substantial compliance
among those for whom it was intended.
But the question persists: when should the Court exer-
cise its power of judicial review9  It has been argued by
at least one constitutional scholar that if the supremacy
clause, Article VI of the Constitution, gives the Court the
power of judicial review, then the Court has an obligation
3. Id. at 270.
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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to reach a decision whenever it has jurisdiction. There
is no constitutional text, certainly, which makes the power
of judicial review available to the Court on a discretionary
basis. If the Court's jurisdiction is properly invoked, so
it is said, there is a duty to render judgment.
What is the traditional response to this position? It
rests on the fact that the doctrine of judicial review owes
far more to Marshall's conception of the necessities of feder-
alism than to any historical basis grounded in the intent
of the Framers or to any textual support in the Constitution
itself. Since there is embarrassed uncertainty about the
birth of judicial review in American constitutional history,
a protective attitude has developed. The gist of that at-
titude is that since judicial review lacks specific mention
in the constitutional document itself, we must be chary of
its use. In fact, we need not look any farther than Frank-
furter's opinion in Baker v Carr 5 for a contemporaneous
expression of this view
It is interesting to note that in the attack which is
presently directed against the Supreme Court by its critics,
the Court's power of judicial review is rarely questioned.
It appears quite evident that John Marshall has very
thoroughly won his great battle with Thomas Jefferson.
The Court's power of judicial review - the power to in-
validate legislation because of its inconsistency with the
the constitutional text - is apparently too deeply entrenched
to be reconsidered at this late date. The institutional
architecture of the Court is not the real target of many of
the Court's contemporary critics. The subject of the attack
is the personnel of the Court, and they are under attack
for their personal views rather than because they belong
to the Court as an institution. We are witness to a rather
angry difference of opinion which revolves chiefly around
the interpretation of the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteen Amendment. But for all
the controversy, what is truly astonishing is that, despite
the slender textual basis for judicial review, that power
as such is now quite generally accepted by all segments
of opinion in this country
5. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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But if judicial review is no longer a subject of contro-
versy, the propriety in any given situation of its exercise
very definitely is. Obviously if the Court refuses review
its act of abstinence has no less decisive effect on law and
society than if it had accepted review in the first place.
If the fear of an unselective approach to judicial review
is that the judges will be free to apply to the broadest
spectrum of problems their own notions of policy, it is of
course just as likely that the declension of review can as
easily be founded on their own notions of policy, i. e. their
contentment (and in the case of an earlier Court - enchant-
ment) with the status quo.
II
If we take a detour into Supreme Court history, we can
find graphic illustrations of the problem of decision without
power An example which dramatically reveals the nature
of the dilemma can be found in a famous encounter between
Chief Justice Taney and President Abraham Lincoln. In 1861
Chief Justice Taney was sitting on the federal circuit court
in Baltimore. One John Merryman had secured a writ
of habeas corpus. He had been arrested and confined to
Fort McHenry because of his sympathies with the Seces-
sionists. The facts of the case are none too attractive.
Taney describes them in his opinion:
"The petitioner resides in Maryland, in Baltimore
County; while peaceably in his own house, with his
family, it was at two o'clock in the morning of the
25th day of May 1861, entered by an armed force,
professing to act under military orders; he was then
compelled to rise from his bed, taken into custody,
and conveyed to Fort McHenry, where he is imprison-
ed by the commanding officer, without warrant from
any lawful authority "
Gen. George Cadwalader, the commanding officer of
Fort McHenry, failed to yield up the prisoner with the
writ. As Taney, in dignified anger, expressed the matter
in his statement of the facts, he refused "to produce the
prisoner before a justice of the Supreme Court, in order
6. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144, 147 (Sup. Ct. 1861).
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that he may examine into the legality of the imprisonment." 7
General Cadwalader justified his defiance on the ground
that the President had decreed that the military could
suspend the writ in their discretion.
The ninth section of the First Article of the Constitution,
declaring the powers of the Congress, states:
"The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended unless when in Cases of Rebellion
or Invasion the public safety may require it."
But the writ in fact had been suspended not by the Congress
but by the President. Surely the constitutional text, if not
the power to compel compliance, was with Taney What
then was he to do? He had authorized the writ to issue.
General Cadwalader refused to deliver the prisoner Taney
decided to write an opinion in the case. He was not con-
fident that his opinion would be obeyed. On the other
hand, he wanted history to know that the Constitution had
been transgressed, and he also wished history to know that
the Supreme Court had not countenanced that transgression.
From a superficial standpoint, analysis of the dramatic
clash between Lincoln and Taney finds Taney on the side
of the angels. Let justice be done though the heavens
fall, and so on. But there is a question which it is impos-
sible to suppress: If Roger Taney had not been the south-
ern sympathizer that he undoubtedly was, would he still
have written an opinion in the Merryman case? Whether
it is private ends that are being exploited by means of
the judicial process or whether it is detached response to
judicial obligation which motivates a court is of course a
secret too submerged ever to be really told.
Professor Clinton Rossiter has asked of the fracas be-
tween Lincoln and Taney, perhaps with tongue in cheek,
whether the law of the matter is what Lincoln did or what
Taney said. So, similarly, we wonder now whether the
law of school desegregation is as we read it in the School
Segregation Cases or as we find it in the deep south. We
are thus met by the question with which we began: Should
7. Id. at 148.
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the Court speak when its decision for the moment falls on
deaf ears?
Chief Justice Taney resolved this unhappy dilemma in
favor of publishing an opinion. He suggests in his decision
a hope that a constitutional lecture might yet incline Lincoln
to change his mind. Taney's decision had no immediate
effect. But on March 3, 1863, in the Habeas Corpus Act,
the Congress, in rather Delphic language, said that the
President was authorized to suspend the writ "during the
present rebellion." This of course was not curative of the
Merryman matter, but it did illustrate in a sense Taney's
wisdom in writing a decision. The law of the suspension
of habeas corpus is still, so far as the precedents of the
Supreme Court are concerned, as the Framers intended.
That a President, and a great President, interfered with
their scheme was not permitted to permanently alter it.
Perhaps Taney has supplied us with the answer to our
question. The Court's power of judicial review must be
exercised wherever it is invoked with jurisdictional propriety
It is true of course that discretion is the essence of
the certiorari process by which the great volume of the
Court's cases come to it. The great mass of petitions for
certiorari are inevitably rejected. Limitations of time and
human capacity necessarily compel such a result. None-
theless, the certiorari process proceeds on the assumption
that cases presenting matters of the greatest constitutional
significance are those that should make up the business of
the Court.
Constitutional problems which come to the Court bearing
the stamp of struggle and conflict should not be turned
aside on that ground alone. In the view of this writer,
it is the responsibility of the Court to hear cases involving
issues whose constitutional time has come. There are
persuasive signs that this view is shared by a majority
of the present Court. Only this term the Court has agreed
to consider a case involving the issue of whether a state
or local government can use its legal process to enforce
a private businessman's policy of not serving Negroes. Will
the court hold that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids
1964]
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businessmen to avail themselves of the legal process of
a state in order to treat one class of their customers dif-
ferently than all others? Or will the case be decided on
some less explosive basis? Whatever the answer, the
Court has not refused to hear the matter This is all the
more remarkable since the celebrated "public accomodations
bill" is currently under such anguished study in the Con-
gress. One can imagine very well how easy it would have
been for the Justices voting on the petition in chambers
to have persuaded themselves that this was - a question
which could be deferred.
These developments suggest an answer to the supposed
impasse between power and decision. The fear that we
as citizens and government officers may not comply with
their judgments cannot activate the Justices. How we react
to their decree is not their responsibility but in the deepest
sense imaginable - ours.
8. H.R. REP No. 7152, 88th Cong., ist Sess. (1963).
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